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The Unites States (US) openly promotes its economic ideology of free-markets through 
foreign aid. It also regards foreign education in the US as a way of spreading its own ideas 
and values among the elite in developing countries. US educated aid recipient country leaders 
may thus receive more US aid, if they share both the cultural values and economic ideology of 
the US. I test this hypothesis using a panel fixed-effects regression model for 896 leaders and 
143 countries over the period from 1981 to 2010. I address self- and donor-selection biases by 
including leader fixed effects in the regression analysis, in addition to the country and year 
fixed effects. In result, I find that, on average, the US allocates 30 percent more bilateral aid 
to US educated leaders with right-leaning political beliefs compared to those with left-leaning 
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The allocation of foreign aid is often motivated by the economic and strategic interests 
of the donor countries as shown by McKinlay and Little (1977). The empirical literature on 
aid allocation suggests that countries with higher income levels receive less aid, while smaller 
countries receive relatively more aid per capita. France allocates most of its aid to its former 
colonies, the US and Japan based on their strategic interests and Nordic countries on the needs 
of the recipient countries (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Berthélemy 2006). In terms of merit-
based aid, the literature suggests that higher levels of democracy may lead to more aid 
(Bermeo 2011). In terms of strategic aid, the research shows that a country’s membership in 
the United Nations Security Council and voting in line with the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) may lead to more aid in the short term (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; 
Dreher et al. 2008).  
In particular, the study by Mckinlay and Little (1977) examines various models that 
would explain US motives when allocating aid. It suggests that aid can be seen as a dimension 
of imperialism, where powerful states employ various strategies to maintain their status-quo. 
Based on this concept, several empirical studies analyze the strategic patterns of aid allocation 
during and after the Cold War (Boschini and Olofsgård 2007; Clist 2011), such as having a 
communist neighbor, and hosting US troops (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998). Other studies 
examine whether the political ideology of a donor country along the liberal-conservative 
spectrum determines the allocation of aid (Brech and Potrafke 2014; Potrafke 2009; Lskavyan 
2014; Dreher et al. 2015b; Milner and Tingley 2010; Goldstein and Moss 2005). Some of 
these empirical findings suggest that right-leaning US politicians are more strategic (Milner 
and Tingley 2010) and give more aid along these lines (Goldstein and Moss 2005). Others, 
however, do not come to the same conclusion (Thérien and Noel 2000). Although 
Scandinavian countries are generally considered to focus more on humanitarian needs rather 
than strategic interests, Schraeder et al. (1998) find evidence on the contrary. They show that 
Swedish aid promotes a pro-socialist ideology and trade in those countries where it can have 
the most impact, which trumps its humanitarian motives. In the case of the US, Lskavyan 
(2014) shows that left-leaning recipients tend to receive more aid under left-leaning US 
governments. In addition, Gaibulloev and Younas (2017) show that during elections years 
donors, on average,  allocate more aid in grants and loans to their  politically aligned  
administrations independent of recipients’ income level. Thus, the research shows that the 
strategic and ideological motives of donors go hand in hand with the economic and 
humanitarian motives of aid allocation.  
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Based on donor-interest models, one could argue that more aid allocation to leaders 
educated in the donor country might help to establish successful bilateral relations and win 
allies. Dreher and Yu (2016) test a similar hypothesis in terms of support in the UNGA 
voting, but do not find any statistically significant evidence suggesting that US educated 
leaders vote more in line with the US on the key (important) issues. In contrast to Dreher and 
Yu (2016), I look at US aid allocation rather than UNGA voting patterns and hypothesize that 
not only is it necessary to have a US education, but also leader’s ideology needs to match with 
US economic ideology (capitalism) in order to attract more US aid. As Harrigan and Wang 
(2011, 1283) state, in “donor-interest based models the ultimate purpose for giving aid is to 
help spread donor values and ideas, such as capitalism, and more recently globalization.” That 
is, when US educated leaders also share the ideology of liberal markets and capitalism, then 
the probability of winning allies becomes more realistic for the US, which can lead to the 
allocation of more US aid to these leaders. 
 I study the case of the US because it openly promotes its economic ideology (free 
markets) in its development aid policies in contrast to other donors such as the United 
Kingdom or France. Hence, it is more likely that US aid allocation decisions depend on the 
“right” values and economic ideology of the aid recipient leaders controlled for other self-
interest motives, such as trade (Berger, et al. 2013, Younas 2008), geopolitics (Kuziemko and 
Werker 2006) need and merit of recipient countries (e.g. income, population, institutions). 
One could also argue that additional aid allocated to right leaders, may also depend on her or 
his personal connections with US politicians. Since both the conservative US politicians and 
the right US-educated leaders are likely to be part of the elite and study in ivy league 
universities in the US, this is quite plausible.
2
  In this case, one would also expect the increase 
in the US aid to be long-term rather than short term, assuming personal connections  are not 
degrading over time.  
Why is US education important? The US government is very open with its motivation 
to spread its own ideas and values via educational exchange programs (e.g. Fulbright 
fellowships), specifically designed to educate future world leaders and promote the mutual 
understanding between US nationals and the rest of the world. Therefore, US educated 
leaders are regarded as potential allies.  
Hence, in this paper, I hypothesize that US educated leaders are more likely to receive 
more US aid if they believe in the dominant economic ideology of the US, i.e. liberal markets 
and capitalism. According to the European definition of left-right politics and economic 
ideology, those supporting liberal markets and capitalism (neoliberalism) are on the right and 
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those supporting state intervention and redistributional policies (welfare state) are on the left. 
Thus, I expect leaders with a ‘right’ ideology and US education to receive more US aid than 
leaders with a ‘left’ ideology and US education. Moreover, I expect the US to use aid as 
‘carrots and sticks’ specifically aimed at US educated left/right leaders because of the higher 
expectation of acquiring potential allies among them.
3
  
I test my hypothesis using a panel data set of 143 countries and 896 aid recipient leaders 
covering the period from 1981 to 2010. The empirical findings show that the US government 
commits 30 percent more bilateral aid to right-leaning US educated leaders compared to the 
left-leaning US educated leaders. The results are stronger in the case of Latin America; in the 
first year of a switch from a non-US to a US educated leader, and are driven by the right 
leadership (Republicans) in the US. These findings contribute to the donor-interest based 
models and shed more light on the politics of US aid.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptualization of the 
hypothesis together with the discussion of the literature on the motives of aid allocation. 
Section 3 provides details on the data and descriptive statistics on US educated leaders and 
US aid allocation. The identification strategy is presented in section 4 and the results are 
provided in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Ideology, US education and US aid 
Throughout its history, US development assistance has shifted its objectives and 
paradigms many times. Initially, in the 1950s USAID’s main objectives were to fight 
communism and spread capitalism, while in the 1970s the focus shifted towards a human 
needs approach and poverty alleviation. In the 1980s it started to support free-markets in the 
aid recipient countries (i.e. Washington Consensus wave). After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the 1990s, US foreign aid was aimed at assisting “functioning democracies with 
open, market-oriented economic systems and responsive social safety nets.” As stated on the 
official website of USAID “Today, USAID staff work in more than 100 countries around the 
world with the same overarching goals that President Kennedy outlined 50 years ago – 
furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free-markets while 
also extending a helping hand to people struggling to make a better life, recover from a 
disaster or striving to live in a free and democratic country.”4  The USAID website also 
explicitly states that its aid to other countries is an integral part of supporting US national 
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interests internationally. Hence, it is unequivocal that the promotion of free-markets and the 
protection of US values have long been one of the main objectives of US aid. This paper 
explores one of the channels of exactly how the US follows through with this objective. 
USAID also has an objective to “invest in people” in developing countries. Therefore, 
the US provides several government funded educational (exchange) programs and 
scholarships for the citizens of aid-recipient (target) countries to study in the US and learn 
about its culture and institutions. For instance, the Freedom Support Act (Freedom for Russia 
and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992) was designed 
to help Central Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union to 
experience the values of democracy and liberal markets through student visit (exchange) 
programs (Tarnoff and Lawson 2016). As noted in the report by an Association of 
International Educators, international students are seen as a great reserve of goodwill for the 
US because by hosting foreign students, the US generates appreciation for its political values 
and institutions (AIE 2003, p.5).
 5
 Unofficial sources, such as diplomatic cables released by 
WikiLeaks, also disclose that the US government seeks to find allies among US educated 
active citizenry in foreign countries. For example, in a confidential communication to the US 
Embassy in Azerbaijan that was requesting information on the elites within the country’s 
government, the US government representative asks if “within the Azerbaijani group AAA 
(an association of alumni from US universities), are any members reform-minded and 
particularly effective?” (Matthews 2012). 
Nye (2004)  argues that US ideas and values exported “in the minds of more than half a 
million foreign students” studying every year in the United States and then returning to their 
home countries, will reach the elites in power in many of these sending countries and 
positively affect the bilateral relations. Since some elites themselves are educated in a donor 
country, they themselves may take-on spreading these values in the home country such as 
democracy (Mercier 2016, Gift and Krcmaric 2015). In 2001, the United States Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell, made a formal statement that the friendship of US educated world leaders 
is a “valuable asset” for the country.6 Hillary Clinton, the United States Secretary of State 
from 2009-2013, known for her “Smart Power” approach in foreign affairs, released the 
following statement in April 28, 2013: “We must use what has been called smart power: the 
full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural 
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– picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation.”7 In one of her interviews 




In fact, some US-graduated world leaders have been close allies of the United States. 
For example, the President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (MPA, Harvard University ’71), 
the President of Panama, Ricardo Martinelli (Business Administration, University of 
Arkansas ’73) and the Prime Minister of Egypt, Essam Sharaf (Ph.D. in civil Engineering 
Purdue University ’84). Nevertheless, others have rather cold relationship with the United 
States, for instance, the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa who has a Ph.D. in Economics 
from the University of Illinois at Urban Campaign ’01 (Friedman and Pavgi 2011).  
Although there is evidence suggesting that citizens and recipient country leaders 
educated in a western country are likely to carry the values of the host country back home 
(Spilimbergo 2009, Gift and Krcmaric 2015, Mercier 2016), Dreher and Yu (2016) do not 
find a clear pattern for American educated leaders’ support of American interests in the 
UNGA voting. Hence, there is no reason to assume that leaders educated in the US are US 
allies by default. Nevertheless, a leader’s education in the US might signal the potential for 
friendship and attract more US aid conditional on an ideological similarity.  
Moreover, the literature shows that country’s fiscal, economic and political 
performance (Hicks, Hicks and Maldonado 2016, Hayo and Neumeier, 2014, Dreher and 
Jensen 2013, Jones and Olken 2005) depends on certain characteristics and background of 
leaders. Moreover, it shows that the field of study may also influence shaping of leader’s 
economic ideology (Fischer, et al. 2017), and leaders that studied in western democracies are 
more likely to bring democratic values back home (Mercier 2016, Gift and Krcmaric 2015). 
The United States is a western democratic country characterized with liberal markets and 
reliance on individual effort rather than the state (Kohut 2011), which are characteristics 
associated with right-leaning economic ideology. In line with the theories of Spilimbergo 
(2009) and Mercier (2016) as well as Nye’s (2004) “Soft Power” concept, US government 
leaders may perceive US educated recipient country leaders as potential allies that share 
common cultural and economic values. This perception may lead US government to allocate 
more aid to US educated leaders with shared ideological values compared to those who do not 
share the same values with the US. However, since economic ideology can also be observed, 
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 Factsheet, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. April 28, 2013. Washington D.C. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/pl/162247.htm   
8
 A Conversation with US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton." CFR.org. Council on Foreign 
Relations, 15 July 2009. Accessed: 10 June 2015. 
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US government will particularly allocate more aid to US educated right leaders and the least 
aid to US educated left leaders.     
Thus, the main question in this study is: Does US education and economic ideology of 
recipient country leaders matter for bilateral US aid allocations? There exist several channels 
on how this can matter, positively or negatively. For example, the US may want to support 
free-markets globally to widen its commercial interests (Berger et al. 2013) and right-leaning 
US educated leaders would be ‘natural’ partners in this. Or it might be easier for the US to 
buy support for its policies via aid (De Mesquita and Smith 2009) specifically from US 
educated leaders with an aligned ideology, as they may have more sympathetic views on these 
policies (Chwieroth 2012). On the other hand, US educated leaders with a shared liberal 
economic ideology may be able to negotiate more effectively with US government officials 
and lock in more aid from the US.
9
  But it could also be the case that education in the US 
transmits values and ideas, which work in the opposite direction when leaders return home as 
they have to support their own economic and national interests back home, and this can be in 
contradiction with US foreign policy interests (Dreher and Yu, 2016). It is also possible that 
leaders may seek an American education only for the sake of prestige or quality, at the same 
time rejecting American ideas, values and foreign policies. In this case, leaders can also reject 
American intervention in their own economy and refuse their aid. Thus, there could be 
multiple channels and directions on how this relationship may work. In the next section, I 
present data and descriptive statistics on US educated leaders and US-aid allocation. 
3. Data on Foreign Education, Aid and Ideology 
In this paper, US bilateral aid is defined as Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
commitments from the US to recipient governments in current US dollars. The data is 
generated from the OECD Aid Statistics, covering the period from 1966 to 2014. During this 
period, some countries have stepped down as aid recipients (South Korea, some eastern 
European states) and some have stepped in (post-Soviet economies and other newly 
independent states). I include all aid recipient countries with data availability listed in the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member list.  
The World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001) provides 
data on the ideological orientation of governments’ economic policies and extends as far back 
as 1975 until 2012. This paper uses the variable of party orientation of the chief executive 
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Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998) examine Swedish aid and find that it is strongly motivated by pro-
socialist ideology and trade benefits aimed at countries where the Swedish impact can be large rather than in 
response to humanitarian need. 
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(hereafter leader) in respect to economic policy (“EXCERLC”), which is defined in the 
following way: 
First, the party orientation of chief executive in terms of economic policy is coded as 
‘right’, ‘left’ and ‘center’ based on party descriptions from the following sources: party 
website, Political Handbook, Agora, Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East, and 
Political Parties of Eastern Europe and the Successor State. Second, if not explicitly stated, 
parties that describe themselves as conservative, Christian democratic or right-leaning are 
coded as ‘right’. Parties that describe themselves as socialist, social-democratic, communist or 
left-leaning are coded as ‘left’. When the party description resembles centrist ideology, for 
example, if a party promotes entrepreneurship in a socially-liberal context, then the party is 
coded as ‘center’. In addition, when certain terms are used in party descriptions, such as 
‘liberal’, ‘progressive’, ‘authoritarian’ or ‘xenophobic’, in the case of former the party is 
coded as ‘right’ (the European definition) and in the case of the last three as ‘authoritarian’. 
Third, in cases where there is an evidence that the chief executive considerably deviates from 
the party orientation “(e.g. austerity policy of a socialist / social democratic party)”, the chief 
executive’s orientation is recorded in the database not the party’s. Same is in the case when 
the executive is independent. In the dataset, those parties that are coded to have ‘no 
orientation’, I code them as ‘authoritarian’ as these are then de facto monarchies or one-party 
states. 
DPI ideology data are frequently used by political scientists and economists (Dutt and 
Mitra 2005, Mukherjee et al. 2009, Ha 2012). Beck et al. (2001) compare their codings with 
the those in Huber and Inglehart (1995) and find it to be the same in the vast majority of 
cases, see Keefer (2012). Dreher et al. (2015a) compare the “EXCERLC”  variable 
with Comparative Parties Data Set (Swank 2009) and with the Comparative Political Data Set 
from Armingeon et al. (2011) and find them to be significantly correlated at the one percent 
level.  
In addition, I compare the DPI coding for chief executive’s ideology with the voting 
pattern of DW-nominate (and the party affiliation) and find the coding to be the same. Since 
DW-nominate is available only for the US, the comparison is also only for the US leaders (see 
Table A3 in the appendix). 
Dreher and Yu (2015) have extended the Archigos 2.9 database of political leaders with 
additional information on the foreign education of leaders. The database includes information 
on a leader’s foreign education and is available from 1840 to 2010.  
Data for additional explanatory variables, such as GDP per capita and population are 
derived from the World Development Indicators (WDI). Data on voting patterns in the United 
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Nations Assembly is from Dreher and Sturm (2010), which extends from 1980 until 2008. 
Data on trade is from the Correlates of War project as well as from the WDI. More details on 
the data’s definitions and sources are provided in the appendix, Table A1. 
 In Figure 1, I plot data on US aid against the ideology of aid-recipient leaders over 
time. It shows that in the last decade of the Cold War period, mostly right-leaning and centrist 
governments received US aid, while the pattern is somewhat reversed in the late 2000s, where 
authoritarian governments tended to receive more US aid as a percentage of their GDP. In 
addition, US aid peaked for leftist and authoritarian governments at the time of the Soviet 
collapse. This is driven by the newly independent states that emerged from the collapse, 
which are coded as ‘authoritarian’ in the beginning of the period. 10 
 Figure 2 depicts where aid-recipient country leaders have been educated. It shows that 
among 896 leaders in the sample, fifty percent have been education in a foreign country and 
fifty percent have only a domestic education. Among the foreign educated, about 15 percent 
are educated in the United States, about 12 percent in the UK and roughly 7 percent in 
France.
11
 The rest of the fifty percent foreign educated studied in the Soviet Union, India and 
other developed and developing countries. It can be observed that the US is by far the largest 
educational host. Figure 3 shows that in terms of regional origin; most of the US educated 
leaders are from the Latin America. 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the results from the t-tests on the differences between 
US- and non-US educated leaders. It shows that US educated leaders receive, on average, 5 
percent more aid as a share of GDP than non-US educated leaders. In terms of economic 
ideology, US educated leaders tend to be more right-leaning, compared to non-US educated 
leaders; however, the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. US 
educated leaders have, on average, one more year of schooling, the countries they lead have a 
higher democracy score, they import more from the US and vote more in line with the US. 
The GDP growth rate and GDP p.c. of countries with US educated leaders is higher; however, 
only in terms of GDP p.c. is it statistically significant at the ten percent level. These 
observable differences between US and non-US educated leaders are included in the 





                                                 
10 
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Note: More than 50 percent of leaders in the sample have foreign education, out 
of which about 14 percent are educated in the US; about 12 percent are educated 
in the UK and about 7 percent in France. The rest of foreign educated leaders 
have been educated in USSR, India and other countries. 
 
 
Note: The graph shows US aid as percent of GDP by recipient’s economic 
ideology over time. For example, the blue line shows US aid committed to 
recipients with right ideology, as percentage of their GDP from 1970 to 2010. 
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Table 1 – Mean group comparison tests for US and non-US educated leaders 
Variables Educated outside of the US US educated  
Stats Obs Mean Obs Mean Difference 
US aid/GDP 4407 0.01 649 0.01 -0.01
***
 
Ideology 4078 1.22 568 1.11 0.11 
Education level 5057 5.67 668 6.76 -1.10
***
 
GDP growth  4324 4.14 642 4.25 -0.12 
GDP p.c. (log) 4404 6.95 649 7.10 -0.15
*
 
Unified Democracy 5010 -0.31 668 0.06 -0.37
***
 
War dummy 5062 0.07 668 0.09 -0.02 
Imports from US (log) 4840 4.55 636 5.96 -1.41
***
 
Share of UNGA votes 3011 0.45 448 0.48 -0.03
**
 
Note: See Tables A1 and A2  in the appendix for variable definitions and sources.  
 
4. Panel Fixed-Effects Estimation Model 
I test the hypothesis outlined in section 2 in a panel regression analysis, where the 
outcome variable is the logarithm of annual US bilateral ODA commitments to each recipient 
country. The panel variables are country and year. The reduced form of the estimation 
equation follows as: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑖𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙
3
𝑛=1 𝑖,𝑡
+  𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡
3











EAS ECS LCN MEA SAS SSF
Note: EAS denotes East Asia; ECS: Europe (Eastern) and Central Asia; LCN: Latin 






Where, LogAid  - is the natural logarithm of ODA commitments from the US to a 
recipient country 𝑖 in period 𝑡 in current US dollars. ∑ 𝛾𝑛𝐼𝐷𝑒𝑜𝑙
3
𝑛=1  – is a set of dummies for 
the economic ideology of the recipient’s de-facto leader, defined according to the left-right 
(authoritarian, right, center and left is the reference group) spectrum in year 𝑡 . US is the 
education dummy for recipient leader 𝑖, which equals 1 if the leader is educated in the United 
States and 0 otherwise in year 𝑡.  X´ is a vector of control variables for the recipient and leader 
𝑖  in year 𝑡 . Main control variables at the country level include unified democracy score 
(Pemtstein et al. 2010) to control for institutions and merit-based aid, GDP per capita, natural 
logarithm of population to control for recipients’ need, natural logarithm of imports from the 
US to control for commercial interests, and share of votes in line with the US in the United 
Nations General Assembly to control for geopolitical motives (Dreher and Jensen, 2013). A 
similar set of control variables are frequently used in the aid allocation literature and they 
capture the altruistic (need-based) and strategic motives of aid allocation by donors. 𝛿 denotes 
country fixed effects, 𝜇 denotes year dummies, 𝜃 leader dummies and 𝑒 is the error term. The 
coefficients on leader’s education in the US and their economic ideology and the interaction 
term of the two are the parameters of interest. I estimate the equation (1) using a country fixed 
effects model with standard errors clustered by country. A fixed effects estimation model 
controls for country-specific and time-invariant omitted variables bias. Leader dummies 
control for leader-specific time-invariant omitted variable bias such as innate abilities, 
personal qualities and connections, field of study, educational institution, socioeconomic 
status, and etc. Thus, leader dummies a.k.a. leader fixed effects control for self- and donor-
selection biases specific to a leader. Year dummies control for time-varying omitted variable 
bias that are common for all recipient countries, such as changes in US ideology, US income 
levels, global financial crises, oil price shocks, and etc. Hence, the identification comes from 
the changes between leaders, controlled for leader time-invariant characteristics in the form of 
leader dummies, and within countries over time. Time-varying and recipient-specific omitted 
variables are included in regression analysis as control variables in robustness tests. In 
addition to this, the identification strategy here assumes that there is no contemporaneous or 
short-term reverse causality between annual US aid commitments and the leader’s education 
in the US, because the latter had taken place long before decisions on U.S aid commitments 
were made.  
In the regression analysis, US education and ideology are binary variables. This implies 
that when US education variable turns from 0 to 1 or vice versa, it indicates a leader change in 
year t, since none of the leaders in the data changed their education from non-US to US 
13 
 
during their leadership. Thus, in a contemporaneous specifications the identification comes 
from the first year in the office.  
In terms of economic ideology, one could argue that US aid influences the choice of 
economic policies of the recipient country. While this is well plausible, it is unlikely that it 
will drastically change the party orientation of the chief executive (leader) in such a short-
term. Additionally, I present ‘placebo-like’ tests for US education by replacing it with UK and 
French education. Furthermore, I conduct a heterogeneity analysis by sample, region and US 
leader ideology. The results are presented in the next sections. 
5. Empirical Results 
In Table 2, I present the results of the fixed effects regression analysis on the allocation 
of US aid. The regression results from columns 1 to 4 show contemporaneous effects without 
including the leader dummies. This helps to see how results change once leader dummies are 
included in column 5. In column 1, I include one of the variables of interest: a binary variable 
for US education that equals 1 if the aid-recipient country leader in year 𝑡 is educated in the 
US and 0 otherwise. Although, the t-tests in Table 1 show that US educated leaders receive 
more aid compared to non-US educated leaders, the regression analysis indicates that that 
difference is not statistically significant when controlling for income, imports from the US, 
UNGA voting pattern, democracy levels, and etc. In column 2, I include the second set of 
variables of interest: dummies for the economic ideology of the leader. The coefficients on the 
binary variables for the right, center and authoritarian ideologies (left is the reference 
variable) are not statistically different from the coefficient of the left at the conventional 
levels. That is, I do not find evidence that the US allocates more or less aid depending on the 
economic ideology of the recipient country leader, ceteris paribus. In column 3, the results do 
not change when all of the variables of interest are included. According to the hypothesis in 
this paper, US aid allocation decisions may depend not only on whether the leader has a US 
education or  right-leaning economic ideology, but rather that both have to be present at the 
same time. In such a case, I expect larger aid flows from the US to recipients with US 
educated and right-leaning leaders. Therefore, in column 4, I include the interaction terms of 
US education and economic ideology dummies. The results show that US educated left-
leaning leaders receive about 37 percent less aid compared to right-leaning US educated 
leaders
12
 and 17 percent less aid compared to those with an authoritarian economic ideology, 
statistically significant at the one percent level, contemporaneously.  
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100(𝑒𝑏 − 1), where 𝑏 is the coefficient of interest. %∆𝑌 is the percentage change in the outcome variable. In 
14 
 
Table 2 – The effects of US education and ideology on US aid allocation. 1981-2010.  
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
US educated 0.05  0.00 -0.63
***
 0.01 
 (0.17)  (0.16) (0.19) (0.41) 
Authoritarian  0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.34 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) 
Right  0.02 0.02 -0.14 -0.16 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) 
Center  -0.16 -0.17 -0.21 -0.07 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.25) 
US educated*Authoritarian    0.79
***
 0.53 
    (0.27) (0.39) 





    (0.19) (0.26) 
US educated*Center    0.49 -0.01 
    (0.33) (0.32) 
Education level -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.07
***
 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 











 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Population (log) 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.09 -0.01 
 (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.76) 











 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 























 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) 
Constant 3.77 3.80 3.50 4.83 4.80 
 (8.37) (8.18) (8.21) (8.31) (12.17) 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leader-FE No No No No Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 143 143 143 143 143 
Years 25 25 25 25 25 
Observations 3239 3208 3206 3206 3206 
R2_within 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.57 
R2_overall 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.18 
Note: Panel level variables are country and year. All columns include country and year  
fixed effects. Column 5 includes leader dummies (Leader-FE). The dependent variable is  
the natural logarithm of annual ODA commitments (current US dollars). Standard errors  
are clustered by country. Significance levels: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
I further control for unobserved heterogeneity in terms of self- and donor-selection bias 
in column 5. It is possible that leaders’ American education and their economic views are 
correlated with unobservable personal characteristics (i.e., negotiation skills, charisma, 
                                                                                                                                                        
this case, it is the percentage change in US aid when the education and ideology dummy is changed from 0 to , 
hence 100(𝑒(0.948−0.630) − 1) = 37%. 
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diplomacy), which in turn attract more US aid. On the other hand, US intervention (via its 
aid) in recipient country politics may lead to the selection of certain candidate as a country 
leader. Both of these factors (personal aptitudes and the mode of coming into power) can be 
viewed as leader-invariant over time. In column 5, I include leader dummies to control for 
these biases, which in turn, reduces the coefficient size of the interaction between US 
education and right ideology,  statistical significant at the five percent level. The coefficient 
for the US educated reference category (left) becomes negligible. This result implies that 
time-invariant leader characteristics are important determinants of changes in US aid 
commitments. 
In Table 3, I use lagged values of control variables in columns 2-3 to capture effects 
coming from country’s previous performance that could have led to the election of certain 
leader. While in columns 3 and 4, I use lagged US education and ideology variables to 
separately analyze the effects for the new (without lag) and “tenured” (two year lag as proxy 
for 2 years in the office) leaders. 
Column 1, Table 3, shows regression results without lags for the comparison purposes 
once lagged variables are introduced. It could be the case that previous country performance 
affects US aid commitments in the following years. In column 2, I use the second lags of the 
control variables to allow for Granger causality for these variables. This increases the within 
R-squared up to almost 60 percent and the overall R-squared up to 36 percent and weakens 
the statistical significance of the interaction term of right and US educated. Thus, previous 
country performance may be partially responsible for the effects detected in column 1 for US 
educated right leader coming into power, especially the voting in UNGA seems to be 
important, in line with the findings of Dreher and Jensen (2013). Furthermore, column 3 
includes second lag of US education and ideology variables. This is meant to test whether the 
effects found in column 1 on the interaction term of US educated*Right hold after two years 
or apply only to the first year of leadership (the change in the US educated variable implies 
change in the leader).
 13
 In the case of second lags, the statistical significance of US 
education*Right interaction coefficient does not hold anymore, indicating that the effects 
found in column 1 apply to first year – newly elected leaders. In column 4, I do not include 
leader dummies to allow for selection bias. The results imply that in the long run, the US 
educated right leaders receive around 25 percent more aid driven by time-invariant leader-
specific characteristics not captured by US education or right ideology. 
                                                 
13
 In the few cases where one US educated leader transfers the power to another US educated leader, the 
lagged effect becomes similar to the contemporaneous effect. 
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Table 3 – Lagged effects  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
US educated 0.01 -0.23 -0.24 -0.56
**
 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.25) (0.22) 
US educated *Authoritarian 0.53 0.13 0.15 0.54
**
 
 (0.39) (0.42) (0.27) (0.26) 







 (0.26) (0.29) (0.25) (0.25) 
US educated * Center -0.01 -0.04 0.21 0.69
**
 
 (0.32) (0.28) (0.28) (0.32) 
Authoritarian -0.34 -0.30 0.08 0.02 
 (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17) 
Right -0.16 -0.22
*
 -0.03 -0.14 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) 
Center -0.07 -0.17 -0.07 -0.31
*
 
 (0.25) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) 
Education level 0.07
***
 0.04 0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 









 (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Population (log) -0.01 0.98 1.05 1.27
**
 
 (0.76) (0.87) (0.88) (0.57) 









 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 









 (0.26) (0.30) (0.32) (0.40) 
Democracy 0.33
**
 0.07 0.06 0.28
**
 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leader-FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Twice lagged controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Twice lagged US No No Yes Yes 
Number of countries 143 143 143 143 
Years 25 25 25 25 
Observations 3206 3197 3204 3204 
R2 within 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.17 
R2 overall 0.18 0.36 0.35 0.29 
Note: Panel level variables are country and year. All columns include country and year fixed effects. 
Leader dummies (Leader-FE) are included from column 1-4. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of annual ODA commitments (current US dollars). Standard errors are clustered by country. 





Thus, in the long run leader-specific characteristics beyond ideology and US education 
play a crucial role for US aid commitments, while in the first year US education combined 
with right ideology may be perceived as a positive signal of alliance for US politicians and 
lead to more aid from the US.  
In the next sections, I further test the robustness of the results in case of time-varying 
omitted variable bias and subsample analysis. 
 
6. Time-varying omitted variable bias 
Although the regression analysis in Table 2 and Table 3 control for the country- and 
leader-specific time-invariant characteristics they do not fully control for the time varying 
factors beyond the few economic and political controls included. For example, since most of 
the effects come from the first year of leader change, many institutional, economic and 
political factors may have become different after this change. Hence, to control for such ex-
ante time-varying characteristics I include 3 sets of control variables on country level: 
institutional, economic and political time-varying variables lagged by one year.   
In column 1 of Table 4, I include a set of institutional variables such as Corruption 
Index and Bureaucracy Quality from International Country Risk Database (ICRG, 2013) and 
Property Rights from the Economic Freedom Dataset. In terms of institutions, higher property 
rights lead to less US aid, which is most likely mere correlation rather than causality as 
stronger property rights are correlated with higher development outcomes, which leads to less 
aid. Nevertheless, other institutional variables do not seem to have any statistically significant 
effect nor does the inclusion of these variables alter the effect of the interaction term on US 
education*Right. In column 2, I include a set of time-varying economic variables again 
lagged by one year. It is not difficult to imagine that a country’s tendency to move in the 
direction of greater economic freedom may affect what kind of leader is elected and how 
much US aid is committed. Hence, I include the level of economic freedom in a country, and 
trade as percentage of GDP, the inflation rate and government expenditure as a percentage of 
recipient’s GDP in the spirit of Burnside and Dollar (2000). Beyond own macroeconomic 
indicators, it could be possible that US economic involvement in the country and US leaders 






Table 4 – Test for robustness of results in Table 2, column 5. Time-varying omitted variable 
bias. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Institutional Economic Political 
US educated 0.31 0.26 0.34 
 (0.39) (0.37) (0.37) 
US educated * Authoritarian 0.23 0.29 0.20 
 (0.38) (0.36) (0.36) 







 (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
US educated * Center 0.04 0.11 0.11 
 (0.28) (0.26) (0.27) 
Authoritarian -0.31 -0.32 -0.30 








 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Center -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
ICRG Corruption Index  0.02   
 (0.05)   
ICRG Bureaucracy Quality 0.09   
 (0.08)   
Property Rights -0.01
**
   
 (0.00)   
US FDI/GDP  0.00  
  (0.01)  
Economic freedom  -0.01  
  (0.00)  
Overall trade/GDP  -0.00  
  (0.00)  
Inflation rate (log)  0.03  
  (0.03)  
Government Expenditure/GDP  -0.01  
  (0.01)  
US government=right  0.96
***
  
  (0.24)  
ICRG  Internal Conflict   0.02 
   (0.02) 
Purges   0.09 
   (0.14) 
Revolutions   -0.00 
   (0.06) 
Riots   -0.02 
   (0.02) 
Guerrilla Warfare   0.03 
   (0.10) 
Government Crises   0.04 
   (0.10) 
General Strikes   -0.08
**
 
   (0.04) 
Assassinations   0.01 
   (0.02) 
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Anti-Government Demonstrations   0.01 
   (0.02) 
US Troops(log)   0.06
**
 
   (0.03) 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Leader-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Controls lagged Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 143 143 143 
Years 25 25 25 
Observations 3202 3202 3202 
R2 within 0.59 0.59 0.59 
R2 overall 0.33 0.33 0.34 
Note: Panel level variables are country and year. All columns include country and year fixed effects 
and set of control variables included in Table 2. Leader dummies (Leader-FE) are included in all 
columns. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual ODA commitments (current US 
dollars). Standard errors are clustered by country. Significance levels: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. 
 
Hence, column 2 includes a variable for the share of US foreign direct investment as 
percent of recipient’s GDP as well as US leader’s economic ideology, although the latter is 
already captured by year dummies. None of the additional economic variables is statistically 
significant nor does their inclusion influences the coefficient on the interaction term of US 
education and right ideology. In column 3, I include a set of political variables (domestic 
conflict events) mostly from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks, 2017) as 
well as number of US troops in a recipient country to control for US strategic interests. None 
of the variables on domestic unrest except from General Strikes show statistically significant 
relationship with US aid. On the other hand, number of US troops in the recipient country 
leads to more US aid commitments, on average.  The coefficient on the interaction term on 
US education and right ideology stays positive and statistically significant at least at the five 
percent level through the columns 1-3.  Thus, the findings in column 5, Table 2, do not seem 
to substantially suffer from institutional, economic and political time-varying omitted variable 
bias, of course to the extent that this bias is observed and measured.  
In the next section I further test for the robustness of the main finding using “placebo-
like” test, and explore the heterogeneity of the effects and outliers using subsample analysis. 
 
7. Placebo Tests and Heterogeneity Analysis 
In Table 5, I perform placebo-like tests to verify that the effect of more aid allocated to 
right-leaning US educated leaders is truly driven by the ideology of the recipient and from 
their US education, specifically. Therefore, in column 1, instead of the ideology of a recipient, 
20 
 
I include an interaction term between US educated leaders (recipient) and a US leader’s 
(donor) ideology, while still controlling for the recipient’s ideology. However, this interaction 
is not statistically significant at conventional levels; hence the effects are not driven by this 
type of match. In columns 2 and 3, I replace US education with UK and French education for 
the leaders. It is possible that an Anglo-Saxon or Western education is the factor driving the 
results and not a US education specifically. However, this does not seem to be the case as the 
coefficients of the interaction terms in the last two columns are not statistically significant at 
the conventional levels. The fact the I find evidence only in the case of US and US educated 
leaders is in line with studies by Kuziemko and Werker (2006), De Mesquita and Smith 
(2007), Stone (2008) and Dreher et al. (2008) that show that the political economy of aid is 
highly present in the US context. 
In Table 6, I conduct an analysis of different subsamples to explore factors driving the 
results. In column 1, I exclude outliers, detected by using Cooks Distance approach. The 
results show the main finding on the interaction term between US education and right 
ideology are not driven by a few leaders in a few countries. In column 2, I exclude the Latin 
American sample, and the results for the coefficients of the interaction terms show that the 
key findings are not statistically significant without the Latin American sample. The 
importance of Latin American sample is not surprising for two reasons. First, as shown in 
Figure 3, most variation in US educated leaders comes from the Latin American sample. 
Second, it is likely that the US government uses foreign aid as a soft power tool especially in 
Latin America in order to establish and sustain itself as the regional power similar to the 
argument on commercial imperialism by Berger et al. (2013).
14
  In Columns 3 and 4, I test 
whether the effects are driven by US left- or right-leaning leaders. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for the US right-leaning subsample (column 4) compared to 
the US left-leaning subsample (column 3) shows that such a strategy is not pursued by US 
leaders on the left but rather by those on the right. In column 5, all explanatory variables are 
lagged by two years as in Table 3, column 4, to analyze lasting effects of the US aid 
allocation. Contrary to the full sample, aid allocated by US right leaders to US educated right 
(and authoritarian) recipients lasts beyond the election year in the recipient countries. 
Furthermore, in columns 6, I exclude the Latin American country sample from the US right 
leaders subsample and in column 7 I again lag all the explanatory variables by two periods. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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Table 5 – Placebo tests, US education and economic ideology15 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  UK FRA 
US educated 0.32
*
   
 (0.17)   
USgov right 1.02
***
   
 (0.24)   
US educated * USgov right 0.21   
 (0.15)   
Western education (UK/FRA)  -0.78
*
 0.26 
  (0.41) (0.39) 
Western education * Authoritarian  0.37 -0.27 
  (0.39) (0.54) 
Western education * Right  0.34 -0.05 
  (0.23) (0.61) 
Western education * Center  0.78
*
 0.01 
  (0.43) (0.56) 
Authoritarian -0.28 -0.31 -0.26 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) 
Right -0.07 -0.11 -0.07 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) 
Center -0.12 -0.19 -0.14 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.22) 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Leader-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country-FE Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 143 143 143 
Years 25 25 25 
Observations 3206 3208 3208 
R2_within 0.57 0.57 0.57 
R2_overall 0.17 0.16 0.18 
Note: Panel level variables are country and year. All columns include country and year fixed effects 
and set of control variables included in Table 2. Leader dummies (Leader-FE) are also included in all 
columns. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual ODA commitments (current US 
dollars). US Gov Right equals 1 if the chief executive of US government (president) is from a right-
leaning party (Republican), 0 otherwise (Democrats). In Column 2, western education equals 1 if the 
leader has been educated in the UK and 0 otherwise. In column 3, western education equals 1 if the 
leader has been educated in France and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are clustered by country. 
Significance levels: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
This exercise shows that in case of US right leaders (Republicans), the statistically 
significant difference in the allocation of US aid between US educated left and US educated 
right (and authoritarian) leaders is robust to the exclusion of the Latin American sample and it 
lasts beyond the first (transition) year. The values for the overall and within R-squared imply 
that the largest variation in US aid commitments is explained by the subsample of US right 
                                                 
15
 I have also tested the hypothesis of this paper in the case of French and UK educated leaders and UK 
and French aid respectively. The regression analysis shows that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected neither in 
the case of the UK or nor France. This implies that donor strategies are not subject to generalization and each 
donor implements its best strategy at hand. 
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leaders. This heterogeneity analysis suggests that the US right leaders allocate about 30-50 
percent (depending on the country sample, columns 5 and 6) more aid to US educated right-
leaning (and authoritarian) leaders compared to US educated left-leaning leaders, lasting 
beyond the leader change year in recipient countries and independent of Latin American 
sample.  
Table 6 – Outliers, heterogeneity analysis by region and US leader ideology 




















 (0.41) (0.80) (0.40) (0.36) (0.36) (0.31) (0.50) 









 (0.39) (0.79) (0.40) (0.35) (0.35) (0.30) (0.44) 
US educated*Right 0.57
**









 (0.26) (0.51) (0.39) (0.27) (0.36) (0.89) (0.79) 







 (0.32) (0.89) (0.49) (0.36) (0.39) (0.47) (0.71) 





 (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.17) (0.28) (0.23) 





 (0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.16) (0.13) (0.22) (0.19) 





 (0.25) (0.31) (0.28) (0.32) (0.29) (0.44) (0.23) 
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leader-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Twice_lagged_cntrls No No No No Yes No Yes 
Twice_lagged_US No No No No Yes No Yes 
Number of countries 143 116 141 143 143 116 116 
Years 25 25 8 25 25 25 25 
Observations 3200 2521 1079 2127 2099 1652 1630 
R2_within 0.57 0.54 0.39 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.61 
R2_overall 0.19 0.27 0.12 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.30 
Note: Panel level variables are country and year. All columns include country and year fixed effects, 
and the set of control variables as in Table 2. Leader dummies (Leader-FE) are included in all 
columns. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual ODA commitments (current US 
dollars). Outliers in column 1 are detected using Cooks Distance approach. Column 2, 6 and 7 exclude 
Latin American countries. Standard errors are clustered by country. Significance levels: *p<0.10, ** 










8. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I hypothesize that the US commits more aid to those recipients who have 
been educated in the US, conditional on the shared economic ideology of a liberal markets 
economy. Using panel data covering 143 countries over 20 years and 896 leaders, 15 percent 
of which have an American education, I find that right-leaning US educated leaders indeed 
receive 30 percent more aid, on average, than left-leaning US educated leaders statistically 
significant at least at the five percent level. I include leader dummies to control for self- and 
donor-selection biases as well as run placebo tests for the US education variable. In addition, I 
exclude the Latin American sample, where most leaders have a US education and experiment 
with subsamples of left- and right-leaning American leaders. The latter analysis shows that 
the difference in the US allocation of aid is driven by US right-leaning leaders.  
Thus, I find robust empirical support for the hypothesis in this paper in the case of US 
right-leaning leaders but not in the case of US left-leaning leaders. In general, these findings 
imply that, on average, the US uses its soft power (more aid for US educated right-leaning 
and authoritarian leaders) to support right-leaning or authoritarian economies, and discourage 
the spread of leftist economic policies among its aid recipients.  
One could interpret these results either as evidence of a strategy to establish ideological 
imperialism or a strategy to allocate aid more effectively via the matching of donor-recipient 
ideologies and values (Dreher, Minasyan, and Nunnenkamp 2015; Minasyan 2016). A win-
win situation could be achieved, if donors match their aid with recipients based on shared 
ideas and values, but not at the expense of other recipients or the suppression of a recipient’s 
interests. Also, in many donor countries, including in the US, development aid agencies are an 
integral part of their foreign affair ministries, which makes aid decisions dependent on the 
donor’s foreign policy interests (Gulrajani 2015). Therefore, the independence of 
development agencies from foreign affairs ministries may partly resolve the concerns related 
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Table A1. Variable definition and sources. 
Variable Definition Source 
US ODA 
commitments (log) 
Natural logarithm of annual bilateral ODA 
commitments from the US to each 
recipient. 
Table DAC2a, DAC(2012). 
US educated A binary variable equals 1,  if a leader is 
educated in the US and 0 otherwise. 
Updated version of Archigos 
2.9 from Dreher and Yu 
(2016). 
Economic ideology: 
Right, Center, left, 
Authoritarian 
A binary variable for the party orientation 
of chief executive (leader) in regards to 
economic policies. 
World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions. Beck et. 
al (2001). 
Education level A categorical variable for education level 
of aid-recipient country leader ranging 
from illiterate to doctorate level. 
Edited version of Archigos 2.9 
from Dreher and Yu (2016). 
GDP p.c. (log) Natural logarithm of annual GDP p.c. in 
international prices. 
World Development 
Indicators. World Bank. 
(2015). 
Population (log) Natural logarithm of annual population in 
the recipient country. 
World Development 
Indicators. World Bank. 2015. 
Imports from the US 
(log) 
Natural logarithm of annual imports from 
the US by the recipient country. 
Correlates of War (COW) 
Bilateral Trade v3.0. Barbieri 
et al. (2009; 2012). 
Share of UNGA 
votes 
Annual share of aid-recipient country 
votes in line with the US stands on the key 
issues.  
Dreher and Sturm (2012). 
Unified Democracy Continuous variable (-2, 2), unified 
measure of democracy. 
Pemstein et al. (2010). 
Ideology of 
USG=Right, Left 
A binary variable for the party orientation 
of chief executive of the US (President) in 
regards to economic policies. 
World Bank Database of 
Political Institutions. Beck et. 
al (2001). 
US FDI as % of GDP Share of annual US foreign direct 
investment in recipient's GDP. 
UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI 
Statistics (2014). 
Number of US troops 
(log) 
Natural log of annual number of US 
troops in the recipient country. 
Kane (2011).  
Economic freedom 
index 
Overall score for economic freedom 
annually. The score ranges from 0-100, 
the higher the score the freer the country. 
Economic Freedom Dataset. 
Gwartney et al. (2014).  
Military expenditure 
as % of GDP 
Share of annual military expenditures in 
recipient's GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators. World Bank. 2015 
Total trade as % of 
GDP 
Share of annual trade (imports+exports) in 
recipient's GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators. World Bank. 2015 
Inflation rate (log) Natural logarithm of (1+consumer price) 
annual inflation. 
World Development 
Indicators. World Bank. 2015 
Government 
expenditure as % 
GDP 
Share of government expenditure in 
recipient's GDP. 
World Development 
Indicators. World Bank. 2015 
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Table A2. List of countries coded as 'Authoritarian' in this study and, correspondingly, 




































AFG 1993 - 2001   GMB 1995 - 2010   PAK 1978 - 2008 
ARE 1975 - 2010   GNB 2000 - 2009   PAN 1975 - 2010 
ARG 1977 - 1983   GNQ 1975 - 2010   PER 1975 - 1980 
ARM 1991 - 2010   GTM 1975 - 1995   PHL 1975 - 2000 
AZE 1993 - 2010   HND 1975 - 1981   PNG 1998 - 2010 
BDI 1975 - 2010   HTI 1975 - 2010   POL 1991 - 1995 
BEN 1996 - 2010   IDN 1975 - 2010   QAT 1975 - 2010 
BFA 2003 - 2010   IRN 1975 - 2010   ROU 1992 - 2010 
BGD 1976 - 2010   IRQ 1975 - 2010   RUS 1992 - 2008 
BGR 1991 - 2009   JOR 1975 - 2010   RWA 1975 - 2010 
BHR 1975 - 2010   KAZ 1992 - 1993   SAU 1975 - 2010 
BIH 1995 - 2010   KEN 1975 - 2010   SDN 1975 - 2010 
BLR 1995 - 2010   KGZ 2001 - 2010   SGP 1975 - 2010 
BOL 1980 - 1982   KHM 1994 - 2000   SLB 1994 - 2010 
BRN 1975 - 2010   KWT 1975 - 2010   SLE 1993 - 2007 
BTN 1975 - 2010   LBN 1989 - 2008   SLV 1980 - 1984 
CAF 1980 - 1993   LBR 1981 - 2010   SOM 1975 - 1990 
CIV 1975 - 2000   LKA 2006 - 2010   SRB 1992 - 1992 
CMR 1975 - 2010   LSO 1987 - 1993   SUR 1976 - 2010 
COD 1975 - 2010   LTU 1998 - 2010   SVK 1999 - 2006 
COL 2003 - 2010   MAR 1975 - 2010   SWZ 1975 - 2010 
COM 1976 - 2006   MDG 1994 - 2010   SYR 1975 - 2010 
CYP 1975 - 1993   MDV 1975 - 2008   TCD 1975 - 2010 
CZE 2007 - 2010   MKD 1999 - 2010   TGO 1975 - 2010 
DJI 1978 - 2010   MLI 1975 - 2010   THA 1975 - 2010 
DZA 1993 - 1999   MMR 1989 - 2010   TLS 2003 - 2010 
ECU 1975 - 2005   MNG 1994 - 2010   TUR 1981 - 2010 
EGY 1975 - 2010   MRT 1975 - 2010   UGA 1975 - 2010 
ERI 1994 - 2010   MUS 1996 - 2009   UKR 2003 - 2010 
EST 2002 - 2010   MWI 1975 - 1994   URY 1977 - 1984 
ETH 1992 - 2010   MYS 1975 - 2010   UZB 2008 - 2010 
FJI 1988 - 2010   NER 1975 - 2010   VEN 1979 - 2010 
GAB 1975 - 2010   NGA 1975 - 1999   YEM 1975 - 2010 
GEO 2005 - 2010   NIC 1991 - 2006   ZWE 1975 - 2010 
GHA 1980 - 2000   NPL 1975 - 2007           
GIN 1985 - 2010   OMN 1975 - 2010           
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DPI DW_party DW_ideol dwnom1 
93-94 1973-1976 FORD right right right 0,486 
95-96 1977-1980 CARTER left left left -0,729 
97-100 1981-1988 REAGAN right right right 0,738 
101-102 1989-1992 BUSH right right right 0,649 
103-106 1993-1998 CLINTON left left left -0,480 
107-110 2001-2008 BUSH Jr right right right 0,981 
111-113 2009-2014 OBAMA left left left -0,378 
Note: This table compares coding of party orientation in DPI with that of DW-Nominate for the case of US 
leaders. Columns 4 and 5 show that the coding is the same also in terms of ideology based on DW scores, where  
dwnom1 indicates voting pattern for certain policies in the Congress. Negative sign of the votes indicates left-
leaning ideology and positive sign of votes indicates right-leaning ideology(Carroll et al. 2009 ) .  
 
 
